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CLASS VOTING IN BRITAIN IN 1979
ABSTRACT

British people are considered to be very aware of their social
class and often categorize each other into either working class or
middle class. Social class categorization usually depends upon a
person's occupation, where doctors are considered middle class while
those doing a manual job are considered to belong to the working class.

As well as categorizing people according to their occupation, a
persons's social class may depend upon other variables, such as where
one lives (working class people usually live in rented accommodation
and middle class people buy their own homes), or whether one stayed at
school beyond the legal minimum school leaving age (middle class).
As
well as people categorizing others into a social class, British people
also have a subjective class identification and are often eager to
admit to which class they belong.
From their subjective class
identification, the British, in the past, have used it as a guide as to
how to vote in elections, so that middle class people usually voted for
the Conservative Party, while working class people voted for the Labor
Party.
In this study, we wanted to determine if this link between social
class and vote has weakened.
We find that the link is still quite
strong, especially when using particular objective class variables.
But we find that there are two types of subjective class identifiers:
passive and active.
When people feel actively working class, then
their tendency to vote Labor is greater than when they have only a
passive affinity with the working class.

JACQUELINE SUSAN MART
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA

CLASS VOTING IN BRITAIN IN 1979

INTRODUCTION
A widely held view of British society is that is is based on
class.

In this Introduction, we briefly review some of the

literature on the subject which explores the nature of class and its
link with voting behavior.

A second generalization about British

society and class is that the link between class and voting behavior
has declined over the last decade and continues to weaken.
some of the literature which looks at this question,

We review

paying

particular attention to the impact of this decline on the fortunes of
the Labor Party in particular.

In the final section of the

Introduction, we examine the nature of class in more detail.
The underlying theme for the rest of the paper is that because
the objective working class are in the majority in Britain, then
Labor should be perpetually in power if the link between party and
class is unweakened.
election to election.
class,

But there are changes in government from
Before voters can vote according to their

they must be aware of their class and it is a self-awareness

of one's image which is an important factor in converting objective
class into vote.

Self-image,

then, has to be a very powerful

characteristic of class and subjective class must come into play
because of the changes in government from election to election.
In Chapter One, we look at the global variable of occupational
grade and its associated variable,

income,

in order to determine how

the whole of the sample divides on subjective class and vote.

We

find that only the two manual occupations contain a majority of the
subjective working class and we use the non-manual/manual distinction
throughout the paper so as to ensure that when we discuss the
subjective working class, we are also referring to the objective
working class (and not the objective middle class who may have a
subjective working class identification).
We then move on to examine the other class variables:
unionization (we also look at work sector: private and public),
education and housing status to compare their individual effects on
the subjective identity of manual workers.

We also look at age and

sex because both variables have been found in the past to have
important effects on voting

behavior.

(Butler & Stokes,

1974). The

lasting effects of childhood socialization are undisputed
(Greenstein,

1965 and Jennings and Niemi,

1968) and we compare the

effects of family class and family party on the subjective image of
manual employees.

We use simple crosstabulations to compare the

numbers of working class identifiers within each class variable and
we examine the effects of these class variables on the Labor vote of
the manual working class.
In Chapter Two, we attempt to look at subjective class in more
detail and at the misidentifiers: those who are clearly part of the
objective and subjective working class but who fail to register a
Labor vote and as a result, vote Conservative.

Apart from our

findings in Chapter One, we

find another possible explanation as to

why those who are objective

and subjective working class vote

Conservative.

The explanation is attributed to the strength with

which one identifies with the working class: what we label "active"
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or "passive" working class.

We assess which variables are affecting

subjective class compared to those affecting the vote.

We end the

paper with multivariate analyses of class identification and vote.
Our conclusion is that while one cannot look at the British electoral
system without looking at social class,

looking at social class in

terms of objective characteristics only is to ignore the powerful
link between subjective class and voting behavior.

METHODOLOGY
Two political parties only are used throughout this paper:
Labor and Conservative.

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) had not

been formed in 1979 and third party shares of the seats in parliament
have never exceeded 2.2% and have only ever averaged 1.4%.
Throughout the paper,

the tables all reveal certain amounts of

objectively working class people subjectively identifying with the
middle class.

One possible theory is that the working class Tory may

have come to acquire a middle class self-image through a Conservative
Party socialization process resulting in an affinity with the middle
class.

Whatever the reason,

the phenomenon is not examined in this

paper.

THE BRITISH ELECTION SURVEY 1979
This paper is based on the 1979 British Election Survey.

The

1979 Survey is a part of a series of surveys which have been
conducted between 1974 to 1979 by the British Election Study at the
University of Essex and are also part of a series of surveys
conducted between 1964 to 1970 by David Butler of Nuffield College,

Oxford and Donald Stokes,

formerly of the University of Michigan.

The 1979 Survey was conducted in May of that year,
general election.

after the

The basic sample was drawn from the electoral

registers of 1974 and contains 3,400 individuals in a sample of
constituencies

(Northern Ireland is excluded).

These individuals

were surveyed in the two election of 1974, polled by mail
questionnaires in the 1975 referendum on Britain's membership of the
EEC,

and interviewed in the 1979 Survey.

The interviews for the May

1979 Election Survey were carried out by professional market research
bureaux.

The British Election Study group at Essex wrote and

designed the questionnaires and monitored the fieldwork.
the questionnaires,

Coding of

data preparation and all the analyses were

carried out at the University of Essex.

CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
The first systematic study of class voting in Britain entitled
The Middle Class Vote was carried out in 1954 by John Bonham.
(Bonham,

1954).

The general idea that came out of the work was that

there was no emergence of a significant sized
after the second world war.

'middle class' until

The new Labor Party received a strong

mandate from the working class for its program of social and economic
reform.

However, Bonham identified a large proportion of people who

were neither poor, urbanized, nor industrialized,
belong to the Marxist ruling class.
now known as the middle class.

and who did not

This group constitutes what is

The group did have a class interest

as they formed the principal opposition to the working class of that
time.

By winning the 1945 election, Labor called attention to the

middle class.
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The increasing affluence of the poor and industrialized
working class lead Goldthorpe and Lockwood to the embourgeoisement
thesis which posited that the Labor Party would increasingly become
out of tune with these growing numbers of affluent workers.
(Goldthorpe,

et a l , 1968).

numbers of affluent,

This thesis was based on the growing

skilled, manual workers who were thought likely

to be instrumental in their voting choices,

and to weigh up the

advantages and disadvantages of the parties before voting for the one
most likely to protect their affluence.

This was in marked contrast

to the non-affluent manual worker who would automatically vote Labor
because of class loyalty,
Butler and Stokes,

reinforced by his economic conditions.
on the other hand,

argued that the Labor

Party had been in existence for approximately sixty years and that
later generations would establish an even firmer political loyalty to
the Labor Party as children of Conservatives became a less and less
significant force.

(Butler & Stokes,

1974:267-268).

Butler and

Stokes felt that the collapse of Conservative strength in the early
1960s disproved the embourgeoisement hypothesis, defined by Butler
and Stokes as:
"... a process of conversion whereby the prosperous working
class acquires the social and political self-images of the
middle class as it acquires middle class consumption
patterns."
(Butler & Stokes, 1974:101).
Butler and Stokes looked at voting behavior in four different
age cohorts: pre-1918;

inter-war;

1945 and post-1951.

They believed

that as the Labor Party had evolved only since the first world war,
it would take time for each generation to be exposed to Labor and to
socialize its children into a party system where Labor was present.

Because loyalties are transmitted in the childhood home, time was
needed for historic attachments to the

’bourgeois' parties to weaken

and for ’secondary' processes to complete the realignment by class.
Those in the 1945 and post-1950 cohorts are voters who were more
strongly affected by such a process than the earlier cohort,
the presence of Labor in the political system.

and by

The gap in cross

voting between classes narrowed in the younger cohorts, which Butler
and Stokes attributed to the decline of Conservative support in the
working class rather than a rise of Labor strength in the middle
class.
Although a Marxist analysis of class may be somewhat deficient
in analyzing British politics,

at least one class theorist agrees

that it is the idea of the division of labor rather than property
which is the basis for social stratification in Western Democracies.
(Parkin,

1971).

Hierarchies of occupations come about as a result of

levels of authority at the workplace and of the amount of status and
prestige that is accorded the occupations by society.
Stokes (Butler & Stokes,

Butler and

1974:70) found overwhelming evidence that

occupation is the best guide to subjective class identity.
When asked what sort of people belong to the middle class,

61%

gave the occupational characteristics of non-manual, white collar,
skilled,

professional,

class people.

and self-employed as being typical of middle

Income and level of living described as rich, wealthy,

and comfortably off came next in the characteristics which belong to
middle class people (answered by 21%).
class people,

When asked about working

occupation as a characteristic was given by 74% of

respondents and working class occupations were described as manual,
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semi-skilled and unskilled,
employees.

people who work for a living,

Income and level of living (poor,

live in poor housing,

and

low income, people who

in slums) were given next by 10% of

respondents.
Authority relations at work were used by Weber (1947) and
Dahrendorf (1959) to define class, and both studies are ultimately
derived from the division of labor which stratifies Western
societies.
In 1958, The Black-Coated Worker (Lockwood) took the
discussion of social stratification based on occupation a step
further and looked at a worker's "market situation" and his "work
situation."

This gave consideration to other components of

occupation,

such as income, job security and social relations.

Robertson notes,
occupations.
(Robertson,

As

there is little problem in producing a ranking of

The problem is where to make the cut-off points.
1984:11).

The most common method of stratification is to divide between
manual and non-manual workers where manual workers constitute the
working class and where non-manual workers make up the non-working
class
category.

The working class consist of manual occupational grades C2

and D (semi-skilled and unskilled manual work) and the remainder (the
non-working class) occupy grades A and B (higher and lower ranks of
management), CIA (skilled non-manual workers) and C1B (skilled lower
non-manual workers).

We discuss these grades in more detail in

Chapter One.
Research into voting behavior in Great Britain has
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consistently revealed a correlation between the class position of the
voter and the party they vote for.

Pulzer wrote that:

"... class is the basis of British party politics;
is embellishment and detail."
(Pulzer, 1967:98).

all else

Evidence followed to show that Britain displayed more class voting
than any other country in the Anglo-American system.

(Alford,

1963).

We can expect a relationship between class and vote in Western
Democracies for the following reasons:
"... the existence of class interests, the representation
of these interests by political parties, and the regular
association of certain parties with certain interests.
Given the character of the stratification order and the
way political parties act as representatives of different
class interests, it would be remarkable if such a relation
were not found."
(Alford, 1963:68-9).
Alford devised an Index to show the level of class voting
c ross-nationally.

(Alford,

1963:19).

percentage of the working class
the percentage of the
In 1979,

The Index equals the

voting for a left-wing party minus

country's middle class who vote for the left.

for example, when 51% of workers voted for Labor and 22% of

the middle class voted Labor, the Index was 51-22 or 29.

The working

class is defined as manual workers and the middle class as non-manual
workers.

The left-wing party is the party which stood overall for

the social and economic interests of the working class in the
particular country in question.

At the time,

(1954-1956), Britain

stood out as the most class-ridden of four countries (UK, USA, Canada
and Australia).
Australia,

(The

16 for the

In the UK, then,

Index for the UK was 41, followed by 34 for
US and an Index of 8 for Canada).
a relationship between objective class and

vote is expected because of the polarization of the two main
political parties'

ideology where both parties espouse policies which
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have clear class connections.

Those who proclaimed the end of

ideology in the 1950s and 1960s were wrong.

The broad "Butskellite"

consensus that reigned from the 1940s to the early 1970s broke down.
This consensus consisted of an acceptance of the welfare state,

a

Keynesian mixed economy and a duty of the government to provide
"full" employment,

low rates of inflation and economic growth.

the two major parties had different priorities,

While

they both had similar

co mmitments.
During the 1970s,

changes came which concentrated on the role

of the state in modern society.

The burden of the growing welfare

state upon the country's economic performance was one of the forces
which brought about change.

Neo-liberal ideas of Hayek (1944) and

Friedman (1971) began to permeate the Conservative Party, while Euro
communism and professional left-wing activists began to mould Labor
Party ideology in response.

The Conservative Party in 1979 wanted to

vigorously restrict the role of the state and was committed to
economic liberalism and deregulation:

it is not the duty of the

government to seek to implement any particular aspect of the good
life;

individuals should pursue it in their own way.

On the other

hand,

the Labor Party wanted to extend the role of the state,

particularly into the private sector in order to link private
industry to social needs, not just to private profit.
[1985],

(See R. Plant,

for a fuller discussion).
In Great Britain,

the Conservative Party is a political party

representing a variety of issue positions - less welfare legislation,
lower personal taxation,
business.

less state intervention in the regulation of

The Labor Party represents interests at the other end of
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the spectrum: more welfare spending,

the redistribution of wealth and

the intervention of the state to regulate business.

Originally,

the

Labor Party was set up by working class institutions to give
political representation to working class economic interests.

Class

interests though are not compleltely homogeneous and never have been.
Britain does not,

as Alford notes, divide into two camps: one

priviliged and the other oppressed.
1967:78).

For this reason,

albeit an important one,

(Alford in Lipset & Rokkan,

class interests are only one factor,

in voter behavior.

Deviations from class

voting may come then through a coalition of interests which cut
across class lines.
Butler and Stokes (1969:4) speculated that changes in voting
behavior could arise through the replacement of the electorate due to
birth and death.

They cited the transition from the Macmillan

triumph in 1959 to the Wilson victory of 1964 as being caused in part
by the replacement of older voters by younger cohorts.
Stokes,

1969: 4).

(Butler &

Another cleavage to cut across class voting is the

support that is given to a party for various odd reasons.
Stokes,

1969:5).

(Butler &

Most importantly, voting may cut across class lines

due to the electors'
(Butler & Stokes,

response to immediate issues and events.

1969: 5).

The 1979 "winter of discontent" was at

least partly responsible for Labor's defeat at the polls later on
that year.

The immigration issue had the ability to convert

substantial numbers of voters,
Conservative support.
Clearly,
Britain,

both working and middle class,

(Butler Sc Stokes,

into

1969: 303-308).

given the numerical dominance of the working class in

and the electoral success of the Conservative Party,

it is
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obvious that there has been substantial working class Toryism.

There

has always been the phenomenon in Britain of the working class
Conservative.

Nordlinger observed that due to Britain's gradual

political development,

there was a fusion of democratic and

hierarchical elements,

with an emphasis on the latter.

1967:Chapter 1).

(Nordlinger,:

In Beer's words:

"our system is one of democracy, but of democracy by
consent and not by delegation, of government of the people,
for the people, with, but not by, the people."
(Nordlinger, 1967:16).
The Tory tradition emphasizes hierarchy with the belief that it is
authoritative leadership which produces the good society - in essence
anti-democratic,

although not authoritarian,

numerous constitutional conventions.
between Labor and Conservative,

since it is checked by

Notwithstanding the differences

it is this Tory conception of the

relationship between government and the electorate which is widely
diffused through society,

and it is this conception that gives rise

to working class Conservatism.

RECENT VOLATILITY IN CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
But,

since the 1960s, the British electorate has shown

increasing volatility.

This volatility has resulted in a decline in

class voting with unfortunate results for the Labor Party.

Labor's

defeat by the Conservatives in 1970 led to four years in opposition
but Labor was back in government by February 1974.

Most of the

writing on Labor's decline begins with the Party's defeat in 1979 and
not surprisingly,

because it is only in retrospect that the decline

in its electoral performance can be assessed.

The 1983 election

defeat of Labor amounted to a continued erosion of its vote over more
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than a quarter of a century.
The elections of February 1974, October 1974 and May 1979
began to show significant departures in traditional voting patterns
in Britain.

In February 1974, the Conservative vote slumped by 8.6%

(the sharpest loss by any party since 1945) while the decline of 6.0%
of the Labor vote represented the worst deterioration by a major
opposition party in 50 years.

The 1970s witnessed a rise in the
'I

third party vote with smaller parties trebling their parliamentary
representation in February 1974.

In 1977, Crewe remarked:

"[T]he coincidence of a national political crisis and marked
electoral change can signify very different things.
It may
amount to no more than an historical movement, a temporary
break from normal politics.
Or it may mark a historical
juncture, the end of one electoral era and the beginning of
another."
(Crewe, Sarlvik & Alt, 1977:133).
The 1979 election departed even further from old voting patterns
producing a 5.2% swing

to the Conservatives with an electoral outcome

that was highest since

the War ingeographical uneveness.

"... the Conservatives' low stock in 1974 could be attributed
to the combination of an increasingly fickle electorate and
short term forces along.
But the placing of the 1979 results
in a long-term and comparative context does suggest a more
enduring basis to Labor's electoral decline."
(Crewe in
Kavanagh, 1982:12).
Political scientists were cautious about calling the 1979 result a
victory for the Conservative Party.

Sarlvik and Crewe's analysis of

the Conservative victory acknowledges that while the Conservative
share of the vote was below earlier post-war election victories and
its share of the total

electorate was down, the margin of the

Conservative win owed itself to a low Labor vote and not a high
Conservative one.
"... the 1979 election was lost by the Labor government rather
than won by the Conservative opposition.
The result spoke
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more eloquently of the electorate's rejection of Labor than of
its
embrace of the Conservatives."
(Sarlvik & Crewe,
1983:5).
The Alford Index for Britain shown as a decline over time
(1964-1979) and Crewe suggests a partisan dealignment thesis based on
the increasing share of the vote gained by third parties.
Sarlvik,

and Alt,

1977).

(Crewe,

If party identification has been closely

correlated with class in the past, then partisan dea’lignment also
reveals a loosening in class identification.
In 1983, only 20.6% of the total electorate voted Labor, the
worst result since 1918 for the Labor Party and a result which
confirmed that Labor was now unpopular in opposition as well as in
government.

The Labor Party has traditionally always been the party

of the working class.

The emphasis is Crewe's because by the 1980s,

he sees the Labor Party as being only a party of the working class.
(Crewe in Kavanagh,

1982:11).

The Labor Party began as an alliance

in parliament of the Social Democratic Federation,
Society,

the Fabian

the Independent Labor Party and the Trade Union movement and

its objective was to try and reconcile in parliament the interests of
working people with socialism.

One of the main reasons why Labor

lost the 1979 election was because of the desertion of the working
class which actually switched to vote Conservative.
Paul Whiteley (1983:94-99) argues that voters not only have
affective evaluations of the parties, but voters need also to make
prospective as well as retrospective evaluations on performance.
Voters tend to judge Labor on its record in the past, not on future
policies.

Whiteley's findings that the common origin of the

ideological,

electoral and financial/membership crises within the
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Labor Party is the failure of Labor to achieve its goals, especially
in office.
Butler and Kavanagh (1980) identify five reasons for Labor's
defeat in 1979: not listening to what the electorate wants;

concern

about trade union power which is linked to the issues of
unemployment; prices and industrial relations;

a failure to retain

the support of the newly affluent worker and failure of the economy
to grow.
Clearly, there are various theories which are put forward to
explain the decline in the share of the vote for the Labor Party.
Robertson's thesis is that class is still important and the idea of a
classless volatile electorate is something which is superficial and
hiding something much more complex.

(Robertson,

1984).

He believes

that classes do matter electorally in Britain because nothing else
does;

for example,

religion has ceased to play any part in British

politics and there is no linguisitc cleavage except where it operates
on a small minority in Wales.
While class voting could still be important for the reasons
that Robertson states; British electoral politics has clearly changed
dramatically in the last 20 years.

Franklin attributes the change to

the decline of class voting for the simple reason that class voting
was held responsible for the stable pattern that persisted in the
past.

(Franklin,

1985: 5).

The consumption model posits that people

can be placed in one of two groups depending on whether important
services in their lives are provided by the state or by the private
sector: housing, health,

education and transport.

therefore based on rational self-interest,

Voting choice is

i.e. which party will best

serve and defend the services one uses.

Franklin dismisses the

consumer model of voting and the consumption cleavage approach
because existing research provides no evidence to support the
presence of a mechanism which would allow people to become aware of
their interests.

(Franklin,

1985: 30-33).

While the theories can account for different social groupings
in Britain,

they do not explain voting behavior.

Socialization

provides a mechanism by which a child growing up in a working class
environment mimics working class behavior.

Based on his results,

Franklin was unable to confirm that the decline in class alignment
was transitory,
the electorate.

based on temporary changes in the class profile of
What he did find is that the decline in class voting

has allowed an equivalent rise in issue-based voting choice.

The

British electorate has now moved to a more sophisticated basis for
voting choice, being no longer constrained to the same extent by
characteristics established during childhood and that British voters
are now more open to issue-based argument.

WHAT IS CLASS?
Up to now, we have spoken about class in very general terms,
where the middle class is defined as those engaged in non-manual
work, while the working class includes manual or unskilled workers.
But class does include more than occupational status, although this
is the main component.
Franklin stresses that his model of class and voting behavior
is implicit within Butler and Stokes' work although they present no
such model and the model begins with the childhood home environment
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where children are socialized into political preferences.
1985:20).

(Franklin,

It is the type of home and the political preferences held

by the adults there that determine the initial political
socialization choices of the child.

Parents voting for Labor will

bring about children who initially vote Labor and parents who are
working class are likely to raise a child who votes Labor.
The school environment is another important medium of
socialization.

Before the mid-1960s,

grammar or secondary modern.

schools in Britain were either

Children were segregated into these

schools at age 11 by means of an academic aptitude test
plus).

(the 11-

If they failed the test, the children went to the secondary

modern school but if they succeeded, they received a grammar school
education.

(Another alternative was to attend private school if the

parents could afford to pay the fees).

The middle-class were over

represented in grammar schools and under-represented in secondary
modern schools so that two schools within the education system had a
class ethos, and education would intervene to reinforce the political
preferences of the home environment.

Since the 1960s, these school

have been disappearing to be replaced by a single Comprehensive
school;

however,

segregation according to academic prospects still

occurs in the school and within the classroom with an over
representation of the middle class amongst those who stay on at
school beyond the minimum legal school-leaving age of 16 years.
Socialization does not end on leaving school but continues
within the workplace.

As we noted earlier,

it is through one's

occupation that we are able to characterize the political ethos of
the workplace.

Additionally, unionization is essentially a
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characteristic of working class life and membership can reinforce
this and increase the likelihood of voting Labor.
Butler and Stokes (1969:46) found that the immediate home
environment was a politicizing component.

The segregating influence

of public housing within areas with large working class populations
had political consequences.

It limited cross-class contacts (as with

educational segregation) and increased conformity of voting choice
according to one's class.

CHAPTER ONE

OBJECTIVE CLASS
Social Grade and Income
As we saw in the Introduction to this paper, occupation has
provided the main basis for characterizing class.

The most commonly

used scheme for classifying social grades was that proposed by a
Working Committee of the Market Research Society and used by
and Stokes in their first work, Political

Change in

Butler

Britain. Married

men and unmarried respondents are classified according to their own
occupation while married women are classified according to their
husband's occupation.
manual,

The grades divide work into manual or non-

the skills and responsibilities of the job, whether

employment or supervision of employees is involved, the prestige of
the job,

and the level of income.

Those who think of themselves as

working class should come from those jobs which are of a manual
nature.
and D.

The social grades corresponding to manual occupations are C2
The grades are as follows and the

the percentage of each grade found in the
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figure inparentheses is
Survey.
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HIGHER MANAGERIAL - GRADE A
Company Directors
Dentists
Clergymen
also:

University Teachers
Architects
Barristers

Qualified Nurses

(13%)
Pharmacists

Farmers with 100-500 acres
Shop Proprietors with 4-9 employees
Senior Managers with 10-25 subordinates
Other Managers with 25 subordinates
Company Secretaries without professional qualifications

SKILLED NON-MANUAL - GRADE CIA
Draughtsmen
also:

(10%)

Bank Clerks

Farmers with 30-90 acres
Telegraph Operators
Typists or Secretaries with at least one subordinate
Civil Service Executive Officers
Local Authority Officers without professional qualifications
Commercial Travellers
Salesmen with a least one subordinate
Shop Proprietors with 3 or less employees
Managers with less than 25 subordinates

LOWER NON-MANUAL - GRADE C1B
Policemen
Street Vendors
also:

Doctors
Surveyors
Solicitors

Senior Managers with more than 25 subordinates
Self-employed Builders with 10 or more employees
Farmers with over 500 acres
Scientists with professional qualifications
Senior Government Officials

LOWER MANAGERIAL - GRADE B

also:

(9%)

(12%)

Caretakers
Factory Guards

Shop Salesmen and Assistants
Telephone Operators
Non-supervisory Clerks

SKILLED MANUAL - GRADE C2

(39%)

Innkeepers
Waiters
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Linesmen
Firemen

also:

Fitters
Painters

Print Workers
Decorators

Coal Miners
Instrument Makers
Clothing Workers
Food, Drink and Tobacco Workers
Construction Workers

SEMI-SKILLED & UNSKILLED MANUAL -

Gardeners
Porters
Farm Workers

Quarrymen
Messengers
Dockworkers

GRADE D

(17%)

Postal Workers
Warehousemen
Laundry Workers
Domestic Workers

Turning to subjective class identification, we find somewhat
surprisingly that only for the two highest occupational levels do
middle class identifiers comprise a majority.

(See Table 1).

However, the level of middle class identifiers (me) declines
substantially as the occupation grades go down the hierarchy, while
the number of working class (wc) identifiers increases.
in parentheses are those of Butler and Stokes (1969).

The figures
Interestingly,

there is an increase in 1979 compared to 1969 in the numbers of
middle class identifiers amongst unskilled manual workers (Grade D)
and a corresponding increase in working class identifiers amongst the
skilled non-manual employees and even amongst higher management.
This might indicate the lessened polarization among the class at
least in terms of identification.

While Butler and Stokes found a

difference in working class identification between Grade A and D of
69% (22% of Grade A identified with the working class compared to 91%
of Grade D), the difference in 1979 was down to 54.5%).
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Table 1:
Subjective Class By Occupational Grade In 1979

(A)

(B)

%

%

(CIA)
%

(C1B)
%

(C2 )

(D)

%

%

me

74 (78)

63 (65)

48 (60)

35 (32)

19 (17)

17 (9)

wc

26 (22)

37 (35)

52 (40)

65 (65)

82 (83)

82 (91)

N=140

N = 2 17

N=167

N-191

N=632

N=272

In 1979, the Conservatives gained a majority in all social
grades except C2 an D, the two manual occupations.

(See Table 2).

Given the traditional role of class in British politics,

it is not

surprising to find that class is highly correlated with vote.

But a

working class job does not automatically translate into a Labor vote
and this was especially true in 1979.

While the Labor vote has

increasead among the three highest job grades since 1969, the Labor
vote has declined (with the Conservative vote increasing) within the
three lowest occupational groupings, particularly amongst those whom
we can confidently call the objective working class (C2 and D).
line with lessened objective class polarization in terms of class
identification we find a lessened vote polarization by objective
class.

In
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Table 2:
Vote By Occupational Grade In 1979

(A)

(B)

(CIA)

(C1B)

%

%

%

%

%

%

Lab

23

28

21

36

59

59

Con

77

72

79

64

41

41

N=105

N = 1 77

N-117

N=144

(C2)

(D)

N=450

N=203

A working class self-image does not translate into a majority
Labor vote from those in CIA and C1B.
found,

Although,

as Butler and Stokes

only these two classes deliver majority support for Labor.

Income
But there are other determinants of class besides job
classification,

and we shall explore several of these.

alternative to occupation is simply income.

The most frequent

The average income in

Britain in April 1979 for males and females across all industries was
just over 86 pounds per week, with the average household income standing
at 104.50 pounds per week.

At the very least, we would expect to find

that those on a low income would have a self-image of being working class
because occupation and income are highly correlated.

But one might

expect a more substantial effect since those within an occupational grade
earning less should be more likely to identify with the working class.
Those on higher incomes should therefore have a middle class self-image.
Those who think of themselves as middle class then,
who have a working class self-image.
the following table:

earn more than those

This can be seen to be true from
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Table 3:
Subjective Class Identification By Weekly Income

Up to 58 ppw

140+ ppw

%

%

me

23

77

wc

77

23

N=658

N=97

While 52% of the sample who earned up to 58 pounds per week voted
Labor,

77% of those earning 140+ pounds per week voted Conservative.

(See Table 4).

(The Conservative vote increases amongst those who earn

above average pay and continues to increase as income becomes higher).
Labor's lead however over the Conservatives is only marginal amongst the
poorest in Britain, whilst among the richest, the Conservative lead is
over 50%.
Table 4:
Share Of The Two Party Vote By Weekly Income

Up to 58 ppw
-

140+ ppw
-

Lab

52

23

Con

48

77

N=658

N=97

Since our concern is primarily with the failure of the Labor Party
to hold on to working class votes, we will be focussing on occupational
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grades C2 and D.

These are the two manual categories (which make up 56%

of the respondents in the Survey),

and are the two categories which have

shown majority support for Labor since 1965.

This therefore implies that

these two grades should also be those who identify with the working
class.

From this

point onwards, we will look at those whom we define

as

objective working

class - manual workers - and who are the only group

to

vote in a majority for the Labor Party.
Work Sector
Since the second world war, the public sector in Britain has
continued to expand with a corresponding increase in persons employed
both by central and by local government.

The Labor Party has always

stood for the further increase and protection of this sector, while the
Conservative Party was pledged to reduce its size if the Party was
elected at the polls in 1979.

Crewe sees these arguments as suggesting

that the vote may have divided along these lines.
1983:

95).

(Sarlvik & Crewe,

This means that those who worked in the public sector were

more likely to vote Labor than Conservative in order to protect their
jobs.

While the Labor vote from the public sector is slightly higher

than the Labor vote from those employed in the private sector,

it is

nothing like the difference between the vote of manual and non-manual
workers.

(Compare Table 5 with Table 2).

Not surprisingly,

the fiercest

resistance to the

Labor

increases in 1979

came from the public sector, resulting in the "winter

of discontent."
vote,

government's 5% cap on public sector pay

Crewe believes this to be one reason for the lower Labor

since the issues in the electoral campaign did not neatly fit into

the public/private sector divide,
employees to support Labor.

and did not mobilize public sector

(Sarlvik & Crewe,

1983: 95).

If Crewe is
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correct about public/private sector differences,
differences within the working class,

and if this extends to

it does not necessarily follow that

the abnormally low levels of Labor voting among public sector manual
workers should be reflected in low levels of working class
identification.

That is, public sector workers should see their class

interests more clearly than private sector workers and, therefore,
identify strongly with the working class.
Table 5:
Vote In 1979 By Private/Public Sector
Manual Employees

Private

Public

%

%

Lab

59

64

Con

41

36

N=304

N=172

Such is not the case, however.

In normal times, we would expect

Labor to do significantly better amongst manual workers in the public
sector.
From Table 6, it can be seen that in 1979, there was a difference
of only 4% in the levels of subjective working class identification
between private and public sector employees.

However,

this should not

obscure the extremely high levels of identification evident in both
groups.
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Table 6:
Subjective Class Identification By Private/Public
Manual Employees

Private

Public

%

%

me

18

14

wc

82

86

N=440

N=228

Union
If public and private sector employment might be expected to have a
marginal effect on voting patterns, unionization should be expected to
have a much more direct impact.

Manual occupation unions have long had a

strong identification with the Labor Party.

The Labor Party,

after all,

was set up to give parliamentary representation to working-class
institutions,

and the unions retain a large official vote in Labor Party

internal affairs.

Unions organize and bring workers together.

In so

doing, they stress the commonality of worker and class experience.

As

Franklin notes, unionization "... can reinforce a working class
occupational ethos and so increase the likelihood of Labor voting."
(Franklin,

1985:

17).

By reinforcing the fact that their members are

members of the working class, and by members having a relationship with
other unionized workers and an indirect one with the Labor Party,
would expect to find that one's subjective class,
located within the working class.

if unionized, would be

We should expect to find then that

union members are more likely to identify with the working class,
take that class

one

identity with them to the voting booth.

and to
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Table: 7
Subjective Class Identification Of Unionized and
Non-Unionized Manual Workers

Unionized
Members

Non-Unionized
Families

%

:

%

me

14

18

wc

86

82

N=346

N=3 65

Unionization only has a very small effect on one's subjective
working class identity (4%), which is surprising considering unionization
is a characteristic of life in the working class.
when it comes to the Labor vote,

(See Table 7).

although the Labor vote drops,

But

it is far

better for the Labor Party to rely on union members than on non-unionized
workers.

Nearly 70% of union members voted Labor, while in families

where there are no unionized employees, only 45% of the respondents voted
Labor.

Unionization increases the Labor vote by almost 25% over its vote

from non-unionized workers.
We should expect to find, then,
to identify with the working class,
them to the voting booth.
hypothesis.

that union members are more likely

and to take that class identify with

Table 8 shows strong support for the voting

While less than half of all non-unionized families supported

Labor in 1979 (45%), almost 70% of unionized manual workers did, a
difference of almost 25%
on the other hand,

Support for the identification hypothesis is,

a bit weaker.

Unionized members are only 4% more

likely to identify with the working class than are non-unionized manual
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employees.

Although this difference is small, we inust remember that the

levels of identification are rather high to begin with and given this
fact, the differences are not unimportant.
Table 8:
Vote In 1979 Of Unionized and Non-Unionized
Manual Workers

Unionized
Members

Non-Unionized
Families

%

%

Lab

69.5

45

Con

30.5

55

N=22Q

N=182

However,

it could be that non-unionized workers tend to be lower

in class grade than unionized workers.
small difference.

If so, this might explain the

It does turn out that 75% of unionized manual

employees come from the C2 grade whilst only 64% of non-union workers do
so.

Dividing the sample into these two groups and testing the effect of

unionization on class identification, we find an augmented effect on
Grade D workers (a difference in working class identification of 10%),
and approximately the same impact as before on Grade C2 workers.
Unionization clearly has an added effect on one's working class
self-image,

(see Table 9).

We can control again for the effects of

working class occupations upon the relationship between unionization and
the vote.

(See Table 10).
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Table 9:
Subjective Class Identification Of Unionized and
Non-Unionized Skilled Manual Workers

C2 Unionized

C2 NonUnionized
%

%
me

15

18

wc

85

82

N=261

N-233

Table 10:
Vote In 1979 Of Unionized And Non-Unionized
Manual Employees

C2 Unionized

C2 NonUnionized

%

%

Lab

71

41.5

Con

29

58.5

N = 1 76

N-171

Unionization then, has a much larger effect on the Labor vote than
on one's subject class image, as seen in comparing Table 9 with Table 10,
although occupational Grade D respondents who are not in a union vote
Labor in greater numbers than non-unionized workers in Grade C 2 .

In

fact, Labor keeps its majority amongst unskilled workers whether they are
in a union or not.

The Labor Party has a clear lead over the
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Conservatives amongst C2 union members but amongst non-unionized Grade C2
employees,

there is no natural Labor vote.

Housing Status
Local housing policy has long been a point of contention between
the Conservative and Labor Parties.

The Conservative Party has

supported fewer public housing starts,
higher rents on public housing.
cases.

As a result,

lower tax rates on property,

and

Labor has favored the opposite in all

in normal years we should expect to find council

housing tenants to be particularly strong Labor supporters.

In addition,

by bringing working class individuals together in common residential
locations, we should expect to find enhanced levels of working class
identification among council housing tenants.
But 1979 was no ordinary election year.

What made it different in

relation to the council housing issue was the Conservatives had pledged
to allow council house dwellers to buy their homes at discounted prices.
As Sarlvik and Crewe point out, this stand cross-pressured council
tenants who were on the verge, given a Conservative victory,
home owners.

(Sarlvik & Crewe,

1983:

100).

of becoming

Such an opportunity could be

expected to weaken both support for Labor among council housing tenants,
and possibly to weaken the levels of class identification,
latter is clearly more speculative.

although the

(Butler and Stokes did find a 20%

drop in working class identification among those who moved from council
housing into home ownership).

(Butler & Stokes,

The data are ambiguous on both counts.

1969:102-104).

Council tenants remained

more likely to identify with the working class (by a 10% difference
compared with home owners),
(by a margin of 21%).

and significantly more likely to vote Labor

(See Tables 11 and 12).

Possibly the lack of
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confidence in how the program would work out limited the effect of the
council housing issue in 1979, although by the 1983 election,
was obvious,

its effect

as council house purchasers shifted in large numbers to the

Conservatives.

(Sarlvik & Crewe,

1983:

102).

Table 11:
Subjective Class Identification Amongst
Manual Workers By Housing Status

Home Owners

Council Tenants

%

%

me

23

13

wc

77

87

N=398

N=383

As can be seen from Table 12, 72% of council house tenants
registered a Labor vote while amongst home owners,

the vote was split

practically equally between the two parties.

Table 12:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers
By Housing Status

Home Owners

Council Tenants

%

%

Lab

51

72

Con

49

28

N=298

N=280
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Socialization Effects
Up to this point, we have been examining current experiences,
their effect on identification and vote.

and

We will now turn briefly to two

variables which predate adult experiences: childhood home and school
experiences.

As Stern and Searing (1973) and others find,

social class

is one of the earliest identifications formed by children.

As a result

we should expect to find important precursors of current identifications,
which in turn
One of

are molded by childhood experiences.
the most important, indeed the most important,

experiences is one's family's social class identification.

of these
Coming from a

working class

environment exposes one to experiences

working class

identification, but the role of direct transmission should

not be ignored.

which will bring

out

Even though we are looking only at manual workers in the

two lowest occupational categories, we should therefore still expect to
find important residues of childhood class experience,

and an important

secondary effect on vote.
As Table 13 shows, there is a very strong support for the
childhood socialization model for class identification.

Up to now, we

have not seen any variable which accounted for more than a 20% difference
in working class identification within the manual worker categories.
Now, however, we see a 37% difference.

Manual workers with middle class

parents were almost four times as likely to identify with the middle
class as were respondents from a working class background.
The effect on vote is somewhat less (only about 20%), but it is
still one of the strongest effects that we have found so far.
14).

(See Table

34
Table 13:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers
By Parents1 Class

Middle Class

Working Class

%

%

me

50

13

wc

50

87
N=773

N = 1 19

Table 14:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Parents' Class

Middle Class

Working Class
%

%
Lab

40

61

Con

60

39

N=83

N=560

Furthermore,
parents'

if we expand our socialization concerns and look at

party in relation to respondent's vote, we find a very wide

difference.

In Table 16, we see that while over 3/4 of those respondents

from Labor homes were Labor voters in 1979, only about 1/4 of those from
Conservative homes were Labor supporters in 1979.
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Table 15:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers
By Parents 1 Party

Both
Conservative

Both
Labor

%

%

me

26.5

14

wc

73.5

86

N=147

N=384

Table 16:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By P a r e n t s 1 Party

Both
Conservative

Both
Labor
-

-

Lab

27

78

Con

73

22

N = 1 11

N=289

Age Left School
Since the mid 1960s,

the number of secondary modern and grammar

schools has decreased since the idea of the comprehensive school was
introduced.

It is therefore a worthless task to try and discern where

people were educated.

We might ask whether the school was a state school

or a private one, but as so few in the Survey were educated in fee-paying
schools, we are still not adequately getting at this class
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characteristic.

This is why Franklin uses the age at which the

respondent left school.

(Franklin,

1985:

12-15).

Most ''grammar school

t y pes” will be those who stay on at school beyond the minimum legal
school-leaving age.

Franklin also notes,

rightly, that comprehensive

schools do not mean that working class and middle class, bright and not
so bright,
roof,

are mixing together.

While they may all be schooled under one

segregation is carried out between and within the classroom.

This

variable is of course linked to one's education and eventually one's
occupation and income.

Those who left school at the earliest legal

opportunity are more likely to be from working class backgrounds and to
end up in jobs lower down the occupational hierarchy earning an average
or below average wage.

From the tables below, we can see that those who

think of themselves as working class will more than likely have left
school at the minimum school-leaving age.

(In the Survey, 81% left

school before the age of 16 years and another 14% left school at 16 years
of age).

Those who stayed at school longer are almost twice as likely to

think of themselves as middle class as those leaving before the age of 16
years.

Notice,

though,

the majority of manual workers who left school at

15 years as against those who stayed on until 16 years and older.
Table 17:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers
By Age Left School

0-15 years

16 years

17-18+ years

%

%

%

me

17

23

26

wc

83

77

74

N=711

N=141

N=46
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Table 18:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Age Left School

0-15 years
%

16 years

17-18+ years

%

%

Lab

61

52.5

48.5

Con

39

47.5

51.5

N=520

N-101

N=33

Demographics
The final two variables we shall examine are the important
demographics of age and sex.

All the foregoing components of class play

a role in transmitting class identification,

and in linking it to vote,

but non-class variables may also attenuate or amplify objectivesubjective class correspondence by structuring the kinds of experiences
that individuals have.

Foremost among these are sex and age.

By being

born into a particular birth cohort, one's future experiences are shaped.
If one is born into a small cohort, that might mean higher pay for the
same work and even though the class of one's job is the same,
experience of that job,

the

and the monetary reward attached to it may not.

On the other hand, being born at a time of relative affluence might make
one's own relative poverty stand out more strongly and reinforce class
identification.
Age is also important in defining the point at which one is in the
life cycle.

Being in a lower class job at 55 years of age is very

different from being in one at the age of 25 years,

and the strength of

one's identification might be expected to vary accordingly.
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Similarly, males and females have very different experiences.

It

is important to remember that females are rated according to their
husbands'

jobs.

Since they do not come into close contact with other

working class individuals in the work environment, we might expect their
levels of class identification to lag behind those of males.

Similarly,

this might reinforce the expectation, based on the 10 elections between
1945 and 1974,

that women are likely to vote Conservative (true in 7 out

of the 10 elections)

and men are likely to favor Labor (true in 9 of the

10 elections).
Looking first at age effects.
into

We

have divided the sample simply

decades of life, while breaking the

youngest group in half. This

leaves us with the following age categories:
and 60+.

18-29, 30-39, 40-49,

50-59

Doing so, we find only a very mild effect of age on class

identification.

Although the relationship is mildly monotonic,

levels of

working class identification vary only between 86% for the youngest
cohort and 22% for the oldest cohort.

The youngest cohort includes both

the baby boom generation and the group coming of age during relative
affluence.

This may have served to counteract the "optimism of youth"

effect that we had also expected to find.
Finally,
find

(See Table 19).

turning to sex differences in identification and vote,

little of importance. Females from

manual worker homes are only

slightly less likely to identify with the working class,
more likely to vote for the Conservatives.

and not at all

(See Tables 21 and 22).

we
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Table 19:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers By Age

18-24

25-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60+

%

%

%

%

%

%

me

20.5

13

17

17

19

21

wc

79.5

87

83

83

81

79

N=78

N=100

N=208

N=160

N =160

N=198

Although the percentage differences across all age groups are not
significant,

it would seem that from the following table, we can say that

the working class are nore numerous amongst the young and less numerous
amongst older manual workers.
Table 20:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Age

18-24

25-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60+

%

%

%

%

%

%

Lab

56.5

63

62

62

57

54

Con

43.5

37

38

38

43

46

N=46

N=62

N=146

N=122

N=128

Crewe (Sarlvik & Crewe:

N=156

1983: 91-3) finds that when compared with

the 1974 election, the swing to the Conservatives from the electorate as
a whole was not as great from the old as from the young (+14% amongst the
18-24 year olds and +6% among the over 65s).

Labor in fact lost most of

its ground since 1974 among the traditionally fickle young.
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Table 21:
Subjective Class Identification
Of Manual Workers By Sex

Male
%

Female
%

me

18

18.5

wc

82

81.5

N=48 7

N=417

Table 22:
rote In 1979 Of Manual Workers
By Sex

Male
%

Female
%

me

58

60

wc

42

40

N=346

N = 3 14

Summary
We began the paper with two generalizations that are widely held
by observers of the British political system.

First, that British

society and politics are based on class; secondly, that the link between
class and vote has declined over the last decade and continues to weaken.
The results of the elections in Britain since the 1970s show that
substantial numbers of the traditional working class (those in manual
occupations) have moved from voting in a majority for Labor to dividing
their support almost equally between the Conservative Party and the Labor
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Party.
To examine the link between class and vote in more detail, we need
a more sophisticated definition of class than that of middle class being
non-manual workers and working class people being employed in manual
occupations.

We therefore used Franklin's model of class:

childhood socialization : school environment
Parents'

class and parents'

: workplace socialization.

party introduce children to their early

political values which could be reinforced within the school and within
the workplace through income, occupation, work sector and unionization.
We looked only at manual employees using this model of class,

and their

subjective class identification was determined by asking whether the
respondent thought of himself or herself as working class or middle
class.
We found unionization to have a strong effect on the Labor vote
and more particularly,

strong support for the childhood socialization

effect on class identification as well as on vote.

CHAPTER TWO

SUBJECTIVE CLASS
Up to now, we have been using a simple idea of class
identification.

We have defined the subjective working class as those

who stated that they were working class, whether they gave that response
spontaneously in response to an open-ended question,

or after being

prompted to put themselves into either the working class or the middle
class.

But those who did not need prompting into their class

identification constituted less than half of the sample.

Over half did

not identify with either class when asked the following question:
"One often hears talk about social classes.
Do you ever
think of yourself as belonging to any particular class.
IF YES, which class is that?"

In response to that question,
middle class category,

17.5% placed themselves in the

and 30% in the working class.

are considered active class identifiers.

These individuals

When asked to make a choice

between being middle class and working class on the follow-up question,
less than 10% were unable to do so, and of the 91% who did make a choice,
68% identified with the working class.
passive class identifiers.

These respondents are considered

This gives us four categories:

Active working class (30.2% of all identifiers);
Passive working class (35.4% of all identifiers);
Passive middle class (16.7% of all identifiers);
Active middle class

(17.7% of all identifiers).
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We will now move to a discussion of the determinants of active
class identification among the objective working class (i.e. manual
workers),

and of the effects of our independent variables on the vote

decision,

controlling for level of class identification.

In order not to

be too repetitive, we will first examine the most important determinants
individually at the zero-order level and then move to a consideration of
the multivariate model relating background variables to class
identification,

and then relating these, plus class identification,

to

voting behavior.
Social Grade
We turn first to the two most common objective class components,
social grade and income.

It is among the two grades of manual workers

(C2 and D) that Labor receives a majority of its vote.

But within each

of these grades, the difference in Labor vote between passive and active
class identifiers is substantial.

Using the following tables and looking

first at skilled manual workers (C2), Labor support is 19% higher among
active working class identifiers than among passive identifiers,

and

Conservative support is twice as great among middle class identifiers as
among active working class identifiers.
workers,

Among the less skilled manual

the difference between active and passive identifiers is less

(11%) but still clearly significant.

Once again,

active identifiers are

only half as likely to support the Conservatives as the middle class
identifiers.
For neither grade does even half the sample actively identify with
the working class,

and there is little difference between the two grades

in the percentage actively identifying with the working class (40% versus
42%).

Similarly,

there is no difference in Labor support between the two
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grades for the active working class.

There is, however,

in Labor support among the passive working class.
not be surprising.
working class,

a 7% difference

That this is so should

For those respondents who identify actively with the

such identification should result in strong Labor support,

particularly as they are objectively working class as well.

But for

those who identify only passively, their objective situation should have
a stronger effect on their vote.

And clearly, the unskilled manual

workers are going to be subject to more pro-Labor influences than their
more affluent brethren.
Table 23:
Vote Of Skilled Manual Workers In 1979

Active WC

Passive WC

MC

%

%

Lab

71.3

52.4

42.7

Con

28. 7

47.6

57.3

N=181

N = 1 70

N=82

%

Table 24
Vote Of Unskilled Manual Workers In 1979

Active WC
%

Passive WC

%

MC
%

Lab

70.5

59.1

38.5

Con

29.5

40.9

61.5

N=78

N=88

N=26
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Income
Looking next at income categories, we continue to find the
dominant effect of subjective class identification.
making less than 58 pounds per week,
pounds per week,

For both those

and for those making more than 58

active identifiers support Labor substantially more than

do passive identifiers.

The difference is 15% for the low income

category and 18% for the higher income category.

On the other hand,

there is no substantial difference between the income levels in Labor
support from either the active or the passive working class.

Income is

also unrelated to the likelihood of active working class identification.
Forty percent of the lower income group and 43% of the higher income
group,

actively identify with their objective class.

Unions
Unions provide enormous organizational and financial support for
the Labor Party.

In addition, of course,

power in the Party.

they have a formal position of

We have seen earlier that union membership is

strongly related to vote, but how strongly is it related to active class
identification,

and how much of the effect of union membership remains

once we control for level of identification?
To begin with, union membership does not raise the level of active
class identification above that of the sample as a whole.

Only 45% of

the union members with manual jobs actively identify with the working
class.

For non-union families,

the percentage falls only to 39%.

The role of unionization is clear, however,
blunt the effect of class identification.
to union members,

in its ability to

And the effect is not limited

but extends to spouses with equal impact.

union members and spouses of union members,

For both

it makes little difference

46
whether one actively or passively identifies with the working class.
both groups,

For

at least 65% of passive working class identifiers and at

least 74% of active working class identifiers support the Labor Party,
and the difference is, in both cases,

10% or less.

Among those respondents with no union members in the family,
class identification effect reasserts itself.

the

Active working class

identifiers are more than 20% more likely to support Labor than are
passive working class supporters.
union membership,
(And similarly,

Once again, without the constraint of

the natural effect of class identification is evident.

the effect of union membership is far greater on the vote

of passive identifiers,

28%, than of active identifiers,

18%).

Housing Status
Housing status has an effect very similar to that of union
membership.

Once again, there is little difference in the percentage of

active class identification between those who own their home and those
who live in council/new town housing.

Forty-three percent of the former

and 41% of the latter identify actively with the working class.
again,

But,

there is an overriding effect of council housing on the vote.

Among those who live in council housing,

71% of the passive working class

and 77% of the active working class voted for the Labor Party,

a

difference of only 6%.
Again,

there is a strong class effect among those respondents who

own their houses or flats.

Within this group,

almost twice as many

active working class identifiers as passive working class identifiers
supported Labor.
Looking at the data in another way, we find,
of social grade,

similar to the effect

that it is among the passive working class that other
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factors come into play.

Active identifiers differ by only 8% in their

Labor support according to their home-owning status,
passive working class, the difference is 34%.

but among the

Just like the experience

of council house living, the subject experience of working class
identification can overcome objective differences,

resulting in an

homogenous vote for the active identifiers.
Family Effects
Turning next to family effects, we will examine both class and
political inclinations of family.

Our expectation should clearly be that

family social class when one is growing up should most strongly affect
one's own class identify,

but that political inclinations of parents

should be more important for voting behavior and partisanship in one's
adult years.
Both of these expectations are borne out.
worker respondents from middle class families,

Among those manual

only 10% actively identify

as working class, while among those from working class homes, 46% so
identify.

Although there is a tendency for respondents from Conservative

homes to be less likely to actively identify with the working class than
those from Labor homes (31% versus 47%), the difference here is far
smaller.
On the other hand,

the effect of childhood political environment

is far greater than that of childhood social class environment.
three subjective class groups,
on vote is greater than 30%,

For all

the effect of family political background

ranging from 31% for active working class to

56% for passive working class to 52% for the middle class identifiers.
The effect of family social class on vote, within categories of
subjective class,

ranges only from 6% to 25%.

Although this latter
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effect is not insignificant,

it does pale by comparison with partisan

background effects.
Sex
Finally, we turn to sex as a determinant of class and vote.

Given

that a substantial percentage of females are not in the workforce,

it

might be expected that they would be less likely to identify actively
with their objective family class,
translate this identification,

and that they would be less likely to

even when it was present,

The data however refute this expectation.

into votes.

There is virtually no

difference in the percentages of males and of females,

from objective

working class homes, who actively identify with the working class (42% of
females and 41% of males).

Furthermore, with the exception of middle

class identifiers, where females are actually 10% more likely than males
to support Labor, there are no sex differences at all in the level of
Labor support within subjective class categories.
Summary
Overall,

it

is clear that at the zero order at least,

of our selected variables

the effects

(with the notable exception of childhood class

environment) on subjective class identification are far weaker than these
effects on vote.

Furthermore,

completely consistent,

although the relationship was by no means

the passive working class was more subject to

objective experience effects than was the passive working class.

But

what we need to do

in order to pull the model together is to

test the

independent effect

of our variables on both subjective class

and vote

while controlling for all of the other variables'

effects.

Only in so

doing can we ascertain and compare both the direct effects on class
identification and the direct and indirect effects of our variables on
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vote.

It is to these regression models that we now turn.

CHAPTER THREE

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF CLASS IDENTIFICATION AND VOTE
Entering all of the explanatory variables into our regression
equation at the same time greatly simplifies our model of class
identification.

Using all ten predictors emphasizes the strong effect of

family social class.
job,

income,

Even controlling for education,

age, sex, and the other predictors,

effect is unchanged.

social grade of

family social class's

The zero order correlation between subjective class

identification and family class was

.28.

The partial correlation,

controlling for nine other variables is .26.

Furthermore,

the multiple R

including all ten predictors is .33, only slightly higher than the
partial for family social class.
Remarkably,

only one other variable (age) is even significantly

related to class identification,

and in this the coefficient barely

reaches significance (t=2.042).

This is interesting in that it shows the

trend,

evident across Western Europe and the United States,

that the

younger voters are much less class oriented than the parental generation.
On the other hand, neither income nor social grade nor work sector
achieves significance at even the .10 level.
Obviously,

the important factors here are the dominant role of

socialization,

and the failure to explain subjective class any better

than we have.

Using 10 plausible predictors, we are able to explain only

8% of the variance.

This is partially due to the restricted variance of
50
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both dependent and independent variables (since we are looking at a
reasonably homogenous population,

i.e. manual workers),

but as well,

it

points out the difficulties in trying to understand the development of
class consciousness,
(Obviously,

even in a class conscious country like Britain.

the use of contextual data would improve our ability to

explain variance,

although it is questionable by how much).

Moving on to the prediction of vote, we find substantially greater
predictability overall.
than 16% of the variance.
model significantly.

Using 11 predictors, we are able to explain more
But still the use of regression simplifies our

Only 4 of the 11 predictors have statistically

significant effects on vote,

and interestingly, none of these overlap

with the predictors of working class identification.
strongest effect on vote is parental partisanship.

Clearly the
This finding is in

keeping with the socialization finding of the strong effect of childhood
social class experiences on respondent's current identification.
cases,

In both

early experiences continue to influence British voters.
In addition,

two other variables have strong effects, union

membership and class identification.
no effect on class consciousness,

Interestingly, union membership has

but a strong direct effect on vote.

This can of course be attributed to the strong organizational effort that
unions are able to mount on behalf of the Labor Party at the time of the
election.

Even if they can not change long term class attitudes, unions

seem to be able to deliver their members on election day.
The effect of subjective class identification is of course to be
expected.

It is interesting that social grade shows a beta of only .02,

and that income is barely significant (t=*2.033), with a beta of only .11,
while class identification shows a beta of .16, even with the controls
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for objective class.

Furthermore,

subjective social class has a

substantially greater effect on vote with delineation between active and
passive working class identification,

than it did without such a

distinction.
(Eliminating the non-significant coefficients,

and re-running the

models produces shifts of no more than .02 in the beta coefficients).

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have established the importance of subjective
class identifications,

showing them to be more important in terms of the

vote than more objective measures.

In addition, we have been able to

suggest determinants of subjective class.
dichotomy or a more complicated measure,
family while growing up is very strong,

Whether we use a simple
the role of social class of

especially when we consider the

absence of any other strong effects among the variables we examined.
Clearly,

class is transmitted from generation to generation,

and seems to

remain relatively impervious to current conditions of employment,
education,

etc.

The role of this generational transmission is reinforced with the
predictions of vote.
parental partisanship,
social class,

First, the single most important factor in vote is
a factor which shares the childhood genesis with

and second,

class identification has a strong direct effect

on v o t e .
To attempt to understand the British electoral decision without
reference to social class is futile.

But to explain social class with

reference to only current job, union membership and the like is telling
far less than half the story.
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